The history of education, as it has been conceived and taught in the United States (and in the West generally), has focused almost entirely on the ways in which our own educational tradition emerged, developed, and changed over the course of the centuries. Although understandable, this means that the many other ways that societies have sought to meet the same challenges have been ignored. This book seeks to redress this oversight by providing a brief yet comprehensive review of a small (...) number of other, non-Western approaches to educational thought and practice. Understanding the ways that other peoples have tried to educate their children--as well as what counted for them as "education"--may help us to think more clearly about some of our own assumptions and values. It should also help us to become more open to alternative viewpoints about important educational matters. (shrink)

This text provides a brief, yet comprehensive, overview of a number of non-Western approaches to educational thought and practice. The history of education, as it has been conceived and taught in the United States (and generally in the West), has focused almost entirely on the ways in which our own educational tradition emerged, developed, and changed over the course of the centuries. Although understandable, this means the many ways that other societies have sought to meet many of the same challenges (...) have been ignored. This book seeks to redress this omission. Its premise is that gaining an understanding of the ways that other peoples educate their children--as well as what counts for them as "education"--may help us to think more clearly about some of our own assumptions and values, as well as to become more open to alternative viewpoints about important educational matters. Because it is not traditionally included in the training of educators, very few have had any real exposure to non-Western educational traditions. Thus, the audience for this book is broad and diverse. Intended as a text for both preservice and in-service teachers, each chapter includes pedagogically helpful "Questions for Discussion and Reflection" and "Recommended Further Readings." The book is equally appropriate for advanced students in graduate programs as well as faculty members. New in the Second Edition: The text has been thoroughly revised to expand and clarify points, update chapters as needed, and improve the pedagogical usefulness of the text. A section on Mayan education has been added to the chapter on the Mesoamerican educational experience. One entirely new chapter "'Familiar Strangers': The Case of the Rom" has been included. (shrink)

Informative and mind-opening, this text uniquely provides a comprehensive overview of a range of non-western approaches to educational thought and practice. Its premise is that understanding the ways that other people educate their children--as well as what counts for them as "education"--may help readers to think more clearly about some of their own assumptions and values, and to become more open to alternative viewpoints about important educational matters. The approach is deliberately and profoundly pedagogical, based in the author's own teaching (...) practice. Designed to be used in pre-service and in-service teacher education courses where substantial critical discussion and debate are encouraged, the text is enhanced by Questions for Discussion and Reflection in each chapter. Updates and Features of the Fourth Edition * NEW! Chapter 2 exploring key features of the 'western educational tradition', and information about the contemporary educational systems in different countries * NEW! Chapter 10 on traditional educational thought and practice in Oceania, with special focus on the Maori in New Zealand, the Hawai'ians, and the Australian Aboriginal peoples * Updated chapter on Africa includes fuller explanation of the diversity within the indigenous African experience, as well as several contemporary cases of state education in Africa * Updated Chapter 4 is designed to help non-Muslims to understand the Muslim educational heritage and the growing issue of Islamophobia * Exploration of Chinese education now includes a special emphasis on the thought of Confucius, the role of the imperial examination system, and the impact of political and economic changes in the 20th century * Updated analysis of contemporary educational practices in Hindu and Buddhist educational thought and practice and brief discussions of Jainism and Sikhism. (shrink)

Interest in the microfoundations of corporate social responsibility has grown over the past decade. In this study, we draw on social learning theory to examine the effects of prosocial leaders on followers’ motivation to engage in CSR practices, and consequently on their CSR performance. Further drawing from social learning theory, we propose that followers’ trait compliance and leader-member exchange moderate the above relationships by affecting the conceptual mechanisms of social rewards and role-modeling motives. We tested our hypotheses with data from (...) a sample of 138 employees who were responsible for implementing an organization-initiated CSR practice. Our results showed that among followers who were high in trait compliance, leaders’ prosocial motivation was positively associated with followers' CSR motivation. In addition, followers’ CSR motivation was positively related to their objective CSR performance when they had a high-quality relationship with their leaders. Our findings advance our understanding of the conditions under which leaders will be more versus less influential on followers’ motivation and engagement in CSR activities. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of our results. (shrink)

"There are things that are more important than peace," Alexander Haig declared during his tenure as Secretary of State of the United States. It cannot be said that this is the most trenchant of the bellicose statements with which Reagan and his colleagues have shocked world public opinion. Nevertheless, this remark by Haig evoked a real storm of indignation. It is cited more frequently than others as a model of extreme irresponsibility and cynical belittling of the most pressing right (...) of the individual and humanity—the right to life. (shrink)

The federal government has a generally unquestioned obligation to provide health care to veterans for diseases or disabilities acquired during military service. Much argued, however, is the government's obligation to offer care for nonservice‐connected disorders. The Reagan administration has sharpened the debate recently by attempting to impose a means test on veterans over sixty‐five who are seeking such care. But the controversy focuses on the wrong issue. Society has a moral obligation to provide adequate health care to all citizens (...) but has no special obligation to care for nonservice‐connected health problems of veterans. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:An Intervention into the Flew/Fogelin Debate Kenneth G. Ferguson Under an aggressive title, Robert FogeUn has recently undertaken to reveal "What Hume Actually Said About Miracles."1 He felt this necessary to correct whathe considers a serious misreading ofHume's essay "OfMiracles" (sec. 10 ofthe Enquiries2), a reading which infers that Hume did not argue thatmiracles are impossible a priori (Fogelin, 81). One writer at least regards this reading so common (...) that she has dubbed it the "traditional interpretation" of Hume's account of miracles.3 At any rate, it finds a strong advocate in Anthony Flew,4 against whom the majority ofFogelin's comments are directed. What I find fascinating about this debate is that both Flew and FogeUn appear to be right. On the one hand, Hume does have the textual resources to marshall a fully deductive argument against miracles, at least, once a strict definition of miracles is admitted. On the other hand, while exploiting these resources, Hume somewhat clumsily mingles in vestiges ofa not-fully consistent inductive argument against miracles which he bases on the balancing of probabilities. I will attempt to identify these two skeins ofargument, in the anticipation that this will help to temper the debate between Flew and Fogelin. Hume opens section 10by promisingan argument that will furnish "an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion" (E 110). Moreover, he claims that "there is here a direct and full proof... against the existence of any miracle" (E 115), a quote which Fogelin repeats seven times (toextractits full flavour). C. S. Peirce, wholate inlife took an interest in Hume's argument, conjectured that Hume hoped to provide a general disproof of all miracles that would not require "a minute analysis of each story"; such a procedure was in fact popular amongthe miracle debunkers ofHume's day, forexample, Rev. Thomas Woolston, whose books were extremely popular.5 Hume's boast of "a direct and full proof might be assumed, offhand, to augur an a priori argumentbased on the comparison ofideas; butitmust notbe forgotten that back in the Treatise (for which the essay "Of Miracles" was originally drafted6) Hume defines a "proof" as an argument "deriv'd from the relation of cause and effect."7 There he contrasts "proofs" explicitly with the type of assured knowledge that comes "from the comparison ofideas" (T 124). Still, Hume requires that proofs, despite their empirical origin, must nonetheless be "entirely free from doubt Volume XVII Number 2 105 KENNETH G. FERGUSON and uncertainty" (T 124); proofs, then, must be superior to ordinary causal arguments that are able to offer only a degree of probability (T 124). By his own examples, namely, that "the sun will rise to-morrow" and "all men must dye" (T 124), likewise from the essay "Of Miracles" itself, that "lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air" and that "fire consumes wood" (E 114), Hume makes it clear that "proofs" are simply to be causal arguments uniformly confirmed by a great wealth of past experience: empirical conclusions so sound that any who deny them "wou'd appear ridiculous" (T 124). Taking Hume's definition of "proof" to heart, we might infer that his "direct and full proof against miracles is not then to be an a priori or deductive conclusion, but instead merely a fully convincing induction, along the Unes of"all men must dye." This,would appear to dispel Fogelin's hope to portray the argument as a priori; but the logic ofHume's special proofagainst miracles is somewhat complicated. As Hume's own selection of examples verify, a proof, at least ordinarily, issues in the confirmation of a law of nature. This contrasts with the special proof against miracles where the object is, of course, not to defend a law of nature, but rather to exploit reasoning about the formation of such laws to prove a result regarding the occurrence of miracles. The proof against miracles, consequently, concerns causes, but is not necessarily a causal argument in the ordinary sense. Indeed, it might be properly thought ofas a "meta-causal" argument, if such a term is allowed. And such an argument may potentially have, as Fogelin proposes, an a priori... (shrink)

Ronald Reagan, in his inaugural address as the Governor of California on January 5th, 1967, poignantly stated the following on the fragility of freedom: -/- "Perhaps you and I have lived too long with this miracle to properly be appreciative. Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. It is not ours by way of inheritance; it must be fought for and defended constantly by each generation, for it comes only once to (...) a people. And those in world history who have known freedom and then lost it have never known it again." -/- These words ring as true today as they did when they were first uttered. And yet, over 55 years later, the majority of countries throughout the world and the majority of people living in them have been quick to relinquish their rights and freedoms under the pretext of “health safety.” Since March 2020, the world has been brought to its knees by what I would argue are unscientific and unethical mandates related to the COVID-19 crisis. These mandates have had a tremendously negative impact on the world economy and the lives of countless individuals. The ‘cure’ that has been offered. (shrink)

Symbols enable people to organize and communicate about the world. However, the ways in which symbolic knowledge is learned and then represented in the mind are poorly understood. We present a formal analysis of symbolic learning—in particular, word learning—in terms of prediction and cue competition, and we consider two possible ways in which symbols might be learned: by learning to predict a label from the features of objects and events in the world, and by learning to predict features from a (...) label. This analysis predicts significant differences in symbolic learning depending on the sequencing of objects and labels. We report a computational simulation and two human experiments that confirm these differences, revealing the existence of Feature-Label-Ordering effects in learning. Discrimination learning is facilitated when objects predict labels, but not when labels predict objects. Our results and analysis suggest that the semantic categories people use to understand and communicate about the world can only be learned if labels are predicted from objects. We discuss the implications of this for our understanding of the nature of language and symbolic thought, and in particular, for theories of reference. (shrink)

One of the major intellectual figures of the twentieth century, Paul Ricoeur has influenced a generation of thinkers.

In this paper, we examine Sextus Empiricus' treatise Against the geometers . We first set this treatise in the overall context of the sceptic's polemics against the liberal arts. After a discussion of Sextus' attitude to the quadrivium , we discuss the structure, the sources and the target of the Against the geometers . It appears that Euclid is not Sextus' source, and neither he, nor the professional geometers, seem to be Sextus' main targets. Of course, Sextus never really makes (...) clear his precise target, but his attacks are rather directed against geometry as a means of modelling the physical world, thus ruining the support geometry was intended to bring to the physical part of dogmatic philosophy. (shrink)

One of the major intellectual figures of the twentieth century, Paul Ricoeur has influenced a generation of thinkers. In this, the first philosophically informed biography of Ricoeur, student, colleague, and confidant Charles E. Reagan provides an unusually accessible look at both the philosophy of this extraordinary thinker and the pivotal experiences that influenced his development. "A valuable introduction to Ricoeur; highly recommended."—_Library Journal_ "[A] lively introduction to the life and thought of one of this century's most notable philosophers."—Norman Wirzba, (...) _Christian Century_ "Reagan lucidly explains Ricoeur's difficult philosophy while shining overdue light on the personality behind it."—Carlin Romano, _Philadelphia Inquirer_ "Combines biographical and philosophical essays with a more personal memoir that makes Ricoeur's humane and magnanimous nature abundantly evident. Four revealing interviews, coupled with photographs, and an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary sources, complete this illuminating study."—_Choice_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:120 A WORD ON BEHALF OF DEMEA Little attention has been given to the a priori argument for God's existence espoused by Demea in Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. This circumstance is neither surprising nor unjustified. Given Hume's well-known theological sympathies, certainly no one would be tempted to regard Demea as Hume's spokesman. Demea's argument plays so small a role in the Dialogues as to suggest that Hume does (...) not take it at all seriously. He may present it only to establish that he is aware of alternative arguments for God's existence, but thinks them even less successful than the design argument and hence undeserving of extensive critique. Yet, if a philosopher criticizes an argument he deems unworthy of respect, he should still provide sound, not spurious, reasons for rejecting it. This is exactly what D. C. Stove has argued that Hume fails to do in Part IX of the Dialogues, assuming, as is generally done, that the speeches of Cleanthes and Philo present reasoning that Hume would personally endorse. Stove argues that most of the criticisms of Demea's argument are "extremely defective, and that they even include an inconsistency" (Stove, p. 300). This contention has been challenged by Donald Stahl, who has published a succinct point by point rebuttal of Stove's contentions.3 The Stove-Stahl controversy only deals with the reasoning presented in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 10 of Part IX because those are the contentions Stove attacks. He has "nothing to say against" the criticisms presented in paragraphs 8 and 9, which he assumes will be generally agreed to be 121 less important than the others (Stove, p. 308). He totally ignores the argument of paragraph 11. However, I am not convinced that the criticisms of these paragraphs are less important and I do have something to say against them. Consequently, instead of intervening directly on either side of the dispute between Professors Stove and Stahl, I shall attend principally to the argumentation of paragraphs 8, 9, and 11. I shall (1) summarize Demea's argument, (2) argue for the significance of the criticisms of paragraphs 8-9, (3) examine those criticisms, and (4) assess the role of Philo's concluding remarks in paragraphs 10-11. 1. Demea's Argument Early on Hume has Demea speak so obviously inconsistently as to make the reader wonder whether this character is supposed to think at all about the implications of the claims he espouses. At the beginning of Part II, he proclaims that God's existence is surely not at issue, since no one of common sense... ever entertained a serious doubt with regard to a truth so certain and self-evident." The nature of God is the only proper object of theological inquiry, and that is "altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us" (D 141)! Given such a radically apophatic position (Hume calls it "mystical"), it is hardly surprising that the sceptical Philo readily concurs, once he specifies that he takes 'God' to mean just "the original cause of this universe (whatever it be)" (D 142). But Demea immediately buttresses his alleged self-evident truth by appealing to the authority of Father Malebranche and the whole tradition of Christian theology, apparently oblivious to the impropriety of 122 supporting an indubitable truth by citing authorities (D 141-142). Further, scarcely more than a page later, after Cleanthes has sketched out the design argument, this same Demea is horrified that Cleanthes gives no abstract arguments or a priori proofs and calls for a "demonstration of the being of a God" (D 143). When, in Part IX, Demea himself undertakes to provide the "simple and sublime argument a priori" (D 188) he expected from Cleanthes, he characterizes the argument as "the common one," which suggests he is more engaged in paraphrasing authority than in thoughtfully arguing. The argument, in fact, as has been generally recognized, closely follows one given by Samuel Clarke in the Boyle Lectures of 1704. 5 Demea begins by assuming that "whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence," (D 188) since nothing can cause itself to exist. He then states a dilemma: in tracing the... (shrink)

Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE Cet article traite des notions de reconnaissance, de justice, et de vie bonne, d'abord, séparément, et ensuite comme un réseau où elles se renforcent et s’impliquent. Je commence en abordant les significations de “la reconnaissance,” et en prenant comme texte de référence Parcours de la reconnaissance de Paul Ricoeur. On peut distinguer la reconnaissance au sens épistémologique, la reconnaissance de soi, la reconnaissance d’autrui sur le plan social et politique. Dans un second (...) temps, je concentre mon attention sur le sens de la justice, dans le sens de la justice judiciaire, c’est-à-dire toute la structure des cours et le système pénal et policier. Enfin, je décris les exigences sociales, légales et politiques pour accéder à "la vie bonne" dans un pays moderne. Des systèmes de transport, d'éducation, marchand, bancaire, etc. sont aussi requis pour atteindre "la vie bonne". L'importance de ces éléments est particulièrement saillante lorsque nous observons ce qui arrive dans des pays en pleine guerre civile comme la Syrie, ou des pays détruits par des forces naturelles, comme le tremblement de terre en Haiti. Ma conclusion est que la "vie bonne" exige la reconnaissance de l’un et de l’autre et d’un gouvernement légitime ainsi que des systèmes de justice. Normal 0 false false false EN-US JA X-NONE. (shrink)

How can citizens construct the political authority under which they will live? I argue that Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) answers this question concerning the constitutive power of political and normative agency by employing four dimensions of mimesis from the Greek and Roman traditions. And I argue that mimesis accounts for the know-how, or power/knowledge, the general ‘man’ draws upon in constructing the commonwealth. Hobbes revalues poetic mimesis through his stylistic decisions, including the invitation to the reader to read ‘himself’ in (...) the portrait of the general man depicted in the text. Hobbes aims for Leviathan to change the ethical dispositions of its readers, turning them from bad to good men as they witness the general man undergoing this ethical transformation in the transition from the state of nature to the civil state. He emphasizes the anthropological dimension of mimesis to explain political disorder since he argues that men assess the honor others attribute them by observing signs and gestures in others’ behavior. Hobbes employs the linguistic dimension of mimesis to describe how men acting as agents can build a normative consensus out of the state of nature. This article positions mimesis as a key term for understanding the intersection between aesthetics and politics before the term ‘aesthetics’ came into parlance. (shrink)